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Abstract 
This paper provides an ongoing analysis to one of the biggest ethical and financial 
scandals in Portugal – Banco Espírito Santo (BES). BES was considered one of the three 
best banks but it went bankrupted and its employees were transferred to a new entity – 
Novo Banco. This study was conducted in order to provide an understanding of the 
employees’ side, which has been forgotten so far. An ethical scandal (sensebreaking) 
creates ambiguity and uncertainty which triggers new sensemaking processes in order to 
understand and derive meaning from the new reality. The methodology followed was 
semi-structured interviews to employees both from the branches and the central services. 
We found evidence that in organizations with strong identification, unethical behavior 
has a significant impact on followers’ – the new process of sensemaking is particularly 
important in this situation because employees suffer more from the disruption of their 
reality.   
 




Ethical behavior has been pushed to the center of the public and media awareness due to 
the recent corruption and ethical scandals in the banking industry and other sectors 
(Eisenbeiß & Brodbeck, 2014). Cases like Enron, Lenham Brothers, amongst other were 
mediatized for weeks.  
In the last years there has been several developments in the literature concerning moral 
identity and ethical leadership behavior (Mayer et al., 2012; Aquino & Reed, 2002; 
Neubert et al., 2009). However, there is still not clear if ethics depends solely in people’s 
morality or if it is related with processes of sensemaking, incorporating personal, 
situational and environment constraints (Thiel et. al., 2012). There are this two views 
concerning leader’s ethical decision making. 
Sensemaking, from a followers’ perspective, which we aim to analyze, is a process to 
reduce knowledge gaps (Ashforth et al., 2008) and to derive meaning from ambiguity 
and/or uncertainty (Maitlis, 2014). It has become more important to academics due to its 
impact in strategic organizational change. The authors mention employees are willing to 
make changes in their roles and practices as long as their sensemaking is successfully 
influenced by the leader. 
There is extensive literature regarding ethical leadership, however the unethical side is 
underdeveloped, as pointed out by Brown and Mitchell (2010), specifically the impact of 
unethical behavior in followers. Additionally there are companies who always were 
perceived as ethical, however due to some strong and impactful scandal we then realized 
they were not. We provide an analysis of a real ongoing case of unethical leadership in a 
company that for over 20 years was perceived as highly ethical – Banco Espírito Santo 
(BES). This case has a huge significance for the Portuguese economy and since its 
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beginning it didn’t leave the media front pages. Financial scandals shock us the most 
because they involve people and institutions one should be able to trust (Boatright, 2009). 
The analysis presented here brings value by filling the literature gap in the impact of 
unethical behavior of CEOs and Top Management Teams (TMTs) on followers – the 
employees – and how it is related to sensemaking processes, especially when a strong 
organizational identification is at place. We analyze employees’ sensemaking processes 
as a consequence of leader’s unethical behavior which disrupted employees’ certainties 
and expectations, creating ambiguity that triggered the new sensemaking.  
When considering other major ethical scandals, like Enron, academics studied mainly the 
criminal practices and the consequences of the constant fight for shareholders’ value 
(Bratton, 2002; Johnson, 2002). Still, there are academics who studied the ethics behind 
the company and how the culture influenced the decision making (Sims, 2003).  
Concerning the BES case, all the worries so far are with its shareholders. We provide here 
an analysis from the employees’ side which has been forgotten up to now. Once the 
unethical scandal came out, all the employees’ reality and certainties fell through. There 
was a sensebreaking and they are now in a new process of sensemaking. It is important 
to understand how these processes can help employees dealing with change, especially 
when all the expectations regarding a company that was the “best” in the market are 
destroyed by now being part of the worst. This is relevant because strong identification 
with the organization creates more difficulties in accepting change. 
The Case 
Banco Espírito Santo (BES) was a Portuguese bank with 145 years of history. It was a 
bank that prevailed over the different politic regimes. In 1974, it was nationalized after 
the April revolution, but in the 90’s the Grupo Espírito Santo recovered the control over 
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the bank during the privatizations period. In 2013, it was the second largest Portuguese 
bank in terms of net assets (80.61 million of euros) and it had an overall market share of 
19.7%, and a 25.5% market share in the enterprise segment, being considered the 
economy motor. It had 643 branches, 2.2 millions of clients and 7369 employees (Grupo 
BES, 2014). It had been the only bank who didn’t resort to external assistant, namely the 
fund for the banking sector from Troika (European Commission, European Central Bank, 
and International Monetary Fund), and its management and employees were very proud 
of it. 
The bank went bankrupt on August 2014 as a consequence of bad management policies 
such as misusing lending money to its own shareholders (Miguel, 2014), the exposure to 
the ruinous businesses from the family (Madeira, 2014), and the high volume of defaulted 
bank loan in BESA (a subsidiary from BES in Angola) (Madeira, 2014). 
The BES case has some similarities with another famous bankruptcies. In 2001 two US 
companies went bankrupt as a consequence of illegal and unethical behavior.  Enron 
manipulated accounting rules and concealed large losses on its projects and WorldCom 
used fraudulent accounting methods to increase its stock price (Forbes, 2013). However, 
the case differs in the sense that the bank was still open in the next day, with the same 
people, but with a different brand – Novo Banco. The loss of an institution with 145 years 
of history had a profound impact on people’s mind, especially on employees who devoted 
their entire career to the organization and its leader. In fact, there was a strong 
identification with the CEO and his (presumably) ethical values which led to feelings of 
betrayal when the bankruptcy news came out. Employees were surprised and shocked 
with the sudden bankruptcy, declared on a Sunday night. To better understand the events 







For this particular case, it is important to focus on ethical and unethical leadership since 
ethical leadership has a direct and indirect impact on followers’ job satisfaction and 
affective commitment (Neubert et al., 2009). Treviño et al. (1998) also mentioned the 
impact leader ethical conduct has on followers’ commitment. Indeed these authors 
conclude that a supported ethical conduct in organizations, which values the “good of 
employees, customers and public”, leads to less observed employees’ unethical behavior 
(page 470). Brown and Mitchell (2010) also support ethical leadership triggers positive 
emotions on followers whereas unethical leadership triggers more negative emotions. 
Newman et al. (2014) pointed out ethical leadership leads to higher levels of both 
affective and cognitive trust.  
Brown et al. (2005, page 120) defined ethical leadership as “the demonstration of 
normatively appropriate conduct through personal actions and interpersonal relationships, 
and the promotion of such conduct to followers through two-way communication, 
reinforcement, and decision-making”. Neubert et al. (2009) arrives to the conclusion that 
it is possible to have an ethical work climate where employees flourish as long as 
managers behave fairly, honestly and are trustworthy, in other words, in which ethical 




On the opposite side, unethical leadership refers to “behaviors conducted and decisions 
made by organizational leaders that are illegal and/or violate moral standards, and those 
that impose processes and structures that promote unethical conduct by followers” 
(Brown & Mitchell, 2010, page 588). 
In terms of ethical leadership behavior at the CEO and TMT levels, what has been studied 
so far concerns the leader’s actions and personal traits. In a study conduct by Treviño et 
al. (2003) through interviews with senior executives and ethics officers, ethical leaders 
are seen as simply doing the right thing in the right way for the right person. They are 
also seen as honest, trustworthy and people of integrity. Ethical leaders set the standards 
and values and communicate them to followers, they create a system that reinforces 
ethical behavior by keeping people accountable for their actions using rewards and 
punishments. 
Ethics and moral walk hand in hand. In fact, a strong moral person is honest and 
trustworthy, a moral manager set and communicate ethical standards and use rewards and 
punishments to ensure those standards are being followed (Brown and Mitchell, 2010; 
Treviño et al., 2000). These two pillars (moral person and moral manager) are considered 
to be essential for ethical leadership (Brown and Mitchell, 2010; Treviño et al., 2000). In 
order to be a moral person and a moral manager, one must have a moral identity, which 
is composed of two dimensions: internalization and symbolization. Symbolization 
captures the public side, how the traits are reflected in the actions, whereas internalization 
captures its private expressions, the moral traits embedded in an individual’s self-concept, 
e.g. honest, caring, and compassionate. Internalization has a stronger relationship with 
moral reasoning (Mayer et al., 2012; Aquino & Reed, 2002). In fact, leaders perceived as 
ethical leaders are those with high moral identity, acting in conformity with common 
understandings of what it is to be a moral person (Mayer et al, 2012). 
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However, there is other perspective on ethical decision making which disregards the 
morality of the leader but instead focuses on sensemaking processes and strategies as a 
way to arrive to ethical decisions (Thiel et al., 2012). The authors defend ethical 
misconduct occurs because leaders have difficulties in accurately making sense of the 
business environment rather than because they do not have the moral standards. 
In this paper we will focus on the employees’ sensemaking since ethical scandals bring 
ambiguity and uncertainty to employees, which instead triggers sensemaking as a way to 
understand and accept change. 
There are several definitions for sensemaking. One of the most famous is the one provided 
by Weick (1995) which defines sensemaking as a process that is grounded in identity 
construction, it is retrospective, enactive of sensible environments, it is social and 
ongoing, it is focused on and by extracted cues, and it is driven by plausibility rather than 
accuracy. Sensemaking is the process of reflecting on the reactions to identity enactment 
and derive meaning from it (Ashforth et al., 2008). Maitlis et al. (2014, page 57) defines 
sensemaking as “the process through which people work to understand issues or events 
that are novel, ambiguous, confusing, or in some other way violate expectations”. 
Individuals as members of an organization seek to clarify what is surrounding in moments 
of ambiguity and uncertainty, in order to derive meaning they extract and interpret cues 
which is the basis that provides order and makes sense of what has occurred (Brown, 
2000). 
Sensebreaking occurs when one questions who he is when the sense of self is challenged, 
it involves the destruction of the meaning constructed so far (Pratt, 2000). When 
sensebreaking occurs an individual’s realities and certainties fall through and a new 
sensemaking process begins as a way to attribute meaning.  
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Sensegiving is the attempt to guide other’s sensemaking (Gioia & Chitttipeddi, 1991). 
Sensegiving serves as a response to sensebreaking and both promote identity enactment 
and sensemaking. The difference between sensemaking and sensegiving is that the first 
involves retrospective and prospective thinking to interpret the reality in a new way, 
whereas the second is the process in which one individual attempts to influence the 
sensemaking of others (Sonenshein, 2010).  
As Weick (1995) mentioned, sensemaking is triggered by failure to confirm one’s self, 
hence identity threat is a powerful prompt for sensemaking. Organizational sensemaking 
is important to strategic change, organizational learning, and innovation and creativity 
(Maitlis et al., 2014). 
Methodology 
August 3rd was the first day of Novo Banco. All employees started to use its brand, 
however the process was not easy. In order to understand the sudden organizational 
change in the employee’s view, we collected qualitative data through the use of semi-
structured interviews. Collaborators both from the branches and headquarters were 
interviewed. The interview was designed to understand the differences between before 
and after the bankruptcy, how employees felt about the event, how the relationship with 
the leader was and what the perspectives are for the future. The detailed interview scrip 
is in appendix 1.  
The interviews were made between September 17th and October 16th. There were 17 
people interviewed, 10 male and 7 female, with an average age of 38, having the eldest 
60 years old and the youngest 22. Those people were, in average, for 14 years in the bank, 
being the minimum 3 months and the maximum 33 years. The majority of the 
interviewees have a higher education. There were seven people from the branches and 10 
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from the central services. We had the intention to record all the interviews, however not 
everyone authorized it, especially the employees whose interviews were realized in the 
branches, which is understandable given the uncertainty context. 
The range of the interviews was between 10 and 90 minutes and were all conducted in 
Portuguese.  
The data collection was difficult because most people were not willing to speak since this 
was a very recent situation and people were afraid of being subject to reprisals. LinkedIn 
was used as a source to find contacts, however it was not very successful as only two 
interviews were arranged through that method. All the other interviews were the result of 
using the personal contact networks. 
Theoretical saturation was achieved since the last interviews did not bring additional 
information (O’Reilly et al., 2012, page 253). 
Findings 
Throughout the data analysis, we followed a comparative approach since data was 
compared across informants and across time - before and after the scandal (Clark et al., 
2010). The approach used was a first-order analysis, consisting in a categorization of the 
facts presented in the interviews transcripts, which are called first-order concepts (Van 
Maanen, 1979). It was established 20 first order concepts (Figure 2) but the interplay 
between the categories was not straightforward (Clark et al., 2010). We proceeded to the 
second-order analysis which employs an alternative view using a more theoretical 
perspective (Gioia et al., 1994), it can be said that second-order concepts are the theories 
one can use to explain the facts (first-order concepts) (Van Maanen, 1979). The first-order 
concepts were clustered in 7 second-order themes: positive organizational identity, over 
identification and groupthink, failed expectations, negative reactions, accountability, 
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expectations about the future, and coping strategies. In the last stage of the data analysis, 
the second-order concepts were aggregated in 3 dimensions: sensegiving and 
sensemaking, sensebreaking, and new sensemaking. These three dimensions consolidate 
the themes in the first two categories into more general categories relevant to the event 
(Clark et al., 2010). 
Figure 2 presents the results of the analytical approach mentioned above. For a more 
detailed understanding of the categories construction, appendix 2 provides the interview 













Sensegiving & Sensemaking 
Positive Organizational Identity. When asked about the relationship with the bank, most 
employees identified pride, commitment and stability as representing the connection with 
the institution: "I was proud of belonging to BES. I was happy for belonging to a bank 
with so many… With a big influence for our country's economy and also in the 
companies' lives. All of that contributed to it, I enjoyed working. "; "My relationship with 
the bank is big and it is more than simply an employee. We defended a brand, an image, 
an institution, a banker’s family, that was… I really felt I was part of the project, of the 
strategy and (...) it had a face, which was always Ricardo Salgado. (...) We defended a 
brand and I saw myself in it"; "When the opportunity to be part of BES came, I had other 
alternatives, but I chose BES as being the safest choice, a solid bank, a big group." The 
employees considered the bank as a solid choice to build a career for life, they considered 
it the best bank in Portugal, and they were proud of belonging to the institution and even 
despised the competition, as we can better seen in the category illusion of invulnerability. 
All of this factors contributed to create a positive organizational identity, where 
employees were happy to belong to the organization. 
12 
 
Over Identification/Groupthink. Employees admired and respected a lot the leader, Dr. 
Ricardo Salgado: "I can say (…) 80 to 90% of the employees saw themselves in Dr. 
Ricardo. (…) He was a father/paternal figure, very charismatic, knew how to deal with 
employees. (…) A faultless person". Indeed, the CEO was an ethical reference - "Inside 
the system I thought he was a reference (…), I saw him as (…) an ethical reference". He 
had the characteristics of a moral manager - "I considered him a person with integrity and 
responsible." As the ethical reference he was perceived as, ethical behaviour were 
incentivized and unethical behaviours were punished - "We also had a colleague that was 
fired because he send a pornographic email to a customer by mistake". We have labelled 
this category of leadership reverence. Moreover there was an illusion of invulnerability 
for belonging to the bank: "My bank was my bank, I sold it to everyone, everyone, even 
without being in the commercial department, I walked into a restaurant and saw 
something from Santander or BPI, 'ehh, what a shame, so you don't have, you are not a 
customer of the best Portuguese bank?'". The leadership reverence together with the sense 
of invulnerability lead to over-identification and groupthink, followed by its draw-backs: 
underestimation of negative indicators and unquestionable beliefs - "We suspected before 
the news, (…) but I never thought it was like this"; "From a certain point in time we 
stopped asking the questions that we should have done, (…) there was a whole 
organization that allowed it to happen (...), in that sense almost all of us, that are part of 
the organization, are somehow responsible."  
It is important to further discuss identification since individuals derive meaning from it 
(Brown & Mitchell, 2010). Organizational identification refers to “a feeling of oneness 
or belongingness to a particular group or institution” (Walumbwa et al., 2011, page 204; 
Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Identification has several positive outcomes that have been 
identified over the years such as cooperation, effort, participation, intrinsic motivation, 
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task performance, information sharing, job satisfaction, and so on. However, there is also 
a dark side – less creativity, continued commitment to a failed project, resistance to 
organizational change. Dukerich et al. (1998) identify several problems arising from over 
identification such as developing an automatic trust in other members, including the 
leader, less perceived need for intervening in questionable behavior and less need to 
question certain dubious behaviors, an inability to question the ethicality of organizational 
behavior, and behaving unethically on behalf of the organization. Some of this problems 
are somehow present in the data, the fact employees stopped asking the right questions 
and under estimated several indicators and signs. Over identification is connected with 
groupthink. Groupthink was a concept proposed by Janis (1972), who defines it as a 
premature concurrence-seeking tendency that interferes with effective group decision 
making (Park, 2000). Some symptoms of groupthink are illusion of invulnerability, belief 
in group morality, stereotypes of out-groups, and illusion of unanimity. Finally, 
groupthink has some consequences on the decision-making quality: incomplete survey of 
alternatives, failure to examine risk of preferred choices, failure to reappraise initially 
rejected alternatives, poor information search, and selective bias in information 
processing (Janis, 1972; Park, 2000). As we can see, over identification also leads to 
groupthink, which together magnify the consequences of each other. The drawbacks 
presented are also found in the data, specifically in the categories illusion of 
invulnerability and unquestionable belief. As previously mentioned employees stopped 
asking the right questions, which together with the symptoms of groupthink – illusion of 
vulnerability and unquestionable belief – lead underestimated the negative indicators. 
We can aggregate the 2nd order categories positive organizational identity and over 
identification/groupthink into a broad dimension called sensegiving & sensemaking. 
Indeed all this factors contributed to the processes of sensemaking that employees did of 
14 
 
themselves as members of the organization. We can also consider the leadership 
reverence as a contributor in terms of sensegiving, since the leader and its 
communications in- and out-side the company guided the sensemaking. In fact, Dr. 
Ricardo Salgado in his publicly communications had boasting the major accomplishments 
of BES, announcing it was the only bank who didn’t use the state funding line in the 
current economic crisis, reinforcing its position as the best bank in Portugal. 
Moreover, identification is strongly related with sensemaking. In fact, Ashforth et al. 
(2008) presented a process-oriented model of how identification may unfold, they view 
the process as a cycle that iterates between organizational sensebreaking and sensegiving 
and individual identity enactment and sensemaking. The process of identification is an 
interplay between individuals and organizations, individuals incorporate elements of the 
organization/the collective in their sense of self by enacting new identities (Ashforth et 
al., 2008). It is through processes of sensebreaking and sensegiving that organizations 
incentive enactment and provide feedback. 
In this case, the previously sensemaking and sensegiving lead to the generation of the 
positive identity and the organizational identify, which then was questioned when the 
bankruptcy news came out. 
Sensebreaking 
Failed Expectations. On a second stage of the interview, the news of the bankruptcy was 
tackled. The interviewees showed some surprise and disbelief. "It never cross my mind. 
(…) The beginning of August was for us a fall of everything on our heads (desabar de 
tudo em cima da cabeça). (…) We didn't even dream of it, (…) with the capital raise in 
June and all…” “[It was] the world going to the dogs (o mundo a desabar em cima da 
minha cabeça), i.e., 'this cannot be happening, this is not real, it is not possible, in a 
weekend, in a Sunday evening coming out a news like this', I don't know, it was all that 
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come to my mind., and more, 'how is it going to be tomorrow morning?'". Additionally 
they felt betrayed by the leader they loved the most. "I felt a bit betrayed because he 
always transmitted an image of seriousness and honesty, in the messages to the 
collaborators and every time he spoke on the media, and then it turn out to be the opposite, 
hence that's it, betrayal." As a consequence, employees lost the identity to which they 
refer to, from one moment to the other they had to pull a different shirt – Novo Banco. "I 
am not embarrassed for being part of Novo Banco, but the prestige is not the same. We 
lost the status". "The Novo Banco still doesn't come down the throat (não desce da 
garganta para baixo) (…) because the BES is still here in the heart". "It is a brand that 
doesn't say anything to me. (…) I feel almost like an orphan". "It is like if it hasn't identity. 
The 145 years of history disappeared." The categories surprise & disbelief, betrayal and 
lost ID represent failed expectations. Actually employees never expected the bank to go 
bankrupted, especially after the capital raise in June. These failed expectations aroused 
from a sensebreaking process. The bankruptcy collapsed the employees’ reality, 
certainties and expectations, it was a disruptive event that made them question their self 
and their fit inside an organization now gone. It is worth mention again the average time 
interviewees were working in the bank was 14 years, meaning they have worked a lifetime 
giving their best to an institution that was not what they thought it was. As a consequence 
of being faced with this new reality and failed expectations they developed negative 
feelings and reactions as we will now see. 
Negative Reactions. As a result of the sensebreaking, employees showed negative 
emotions. They were disappointed and sad - "When we start realizing what was 
happening, it was a disappointment, it was quite sad". The process and the lack of 
information resulted in instability and worries - "Then there is the fact of being in an 
indefinite situation. (…) There is a motivation and an insecurity problem. (…) It is a big 
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stress factor, there is no information". In some cases there was even psychophysiological 
reactions - "I have colleagues in the branches with beginnings of heart attacks and strokes, 
being sent to the hospital in ambulances. (…) Even I, I have here a huge line of people 
just waiting to talk to me. I had panic attacks where I had to go to the back-office to pull 
myself together and then come back as nothing happened and keep talking to them".  The 
psychological struggling is a consequence of the sensebreaking. The sensebreaking 
generated uncertainty and ambiguity, which created the need to understand and attribute 
meaning to the new reality, meaning employees entered in a new sensemaking. 
New sensemaking 
Accountability. Employees when asked if they believe the fault was internal or external, 
gave contradictory opinions. Some believe there is internal accountability - "It feels like 
there was a strong weigh on the management side of the bank. (…) There was negligence 
in controlling parts of the group, as it is the case if BES Angola. (…) It was the so called 
going through the motions (empurrar com a barriga para a frente) in the case of Espírito 
Santo Financial Group, where it feels like he was trying to save the assets and was always 
digging deeper and deeper (...) The responsibility is more internal than external". And 
then there are employees that identify multiple accountability, both internal and external 
- "I think it is a bit of both. (…) BES went for the crisis without officialising it was in 
crisis, therefore it is natural that the crisis has influenced it. (…) The other part is also 
true, I mean, when you make decisions usually you know what you are doing". The 
confusion in attributing responsibilities are processes of sensemaking to understand a new 
reality and to create a new self inside a now new organization.  
Expectations about the Future. In a third stage of the interview, we asked about 
employees’ expectations regarding the future. Some employees demonstrated hope, 
others scepticism. "Now more than ever it is a bank that can be trusted. [because all the 
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toxic assets were removed]". "The Novo Banco hardly, I do not believe at all, will remain 
as Novo Banco, hence the name. (…) The Novo Bank is … is nothing, it is a transactional 
figure, it is at contract, we have here a fixed-term contract where it is Novo Banco. We 
do not identify with it, not even with the butterfly (...)". 
Coping Strategies. Some employees look for a future inside the bank, which we labelled 
of resilience - "We were here the next day.(…) We have the ambition of making this 
work"- others look for alternatives outside the bank, developing a new action plan-"My 
plan is to pay attention, to everything, all the news, all the details people mention, and 
keep my eyes in the labour market, try to find a back-up plan as soon as possible."- and 
there are still a third category of employees that demonstrated inertia - "I feel indifferent 
(…) because I am no longer emotionally connected, I am just waiting for the end".  
Weick (1988) asserts that action is an integral part of sensemaking. There are two possible 
courses of action – active or passive coping. According to Folkman (1984), coping refers 
to cognitive and behavioral efforts to master, decrease, or accept the internal and/or 
external demands that are generated by a stressful event. This means that if a stressful 
incident occurs a person has to do something to deal with the problem. Indeed, coping 
strategies are individual approaches to stressful events (Ippolito et al., 2005). Active 
coping strategies are problem-oriented and buffer the impact of stress on mental health 
outcomes (Jex et al., 2001). In the data we can see the categories Resilience and New 
Action Plan are both active, they are taking actions, following a strategy. Avoidance or 
passive coping strategies have typically been found to be disadvantageous (Ippolito et al., 
2005) and in the data are found in the category inertia since this approach lacks a strategy. 
Discussion 
The data analysis showed an ethically perceived leader which fostered followers’ 
commitment and job satisfaction, as pointed out by Neubert et al. (2009). However once 
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the unethical behaviours became public, it triggered negative emotions, such as 
disappointment, worry and betrayal which prompted efforts to determine who was 
accountable for the scandal. Brown and Mitchell (2010) also support ethical leadership 
triggers positive emotions on followers, whereas unethical leadership triggers negative 
emotions. Through the negative emotions and failed expectations we could see the impact 
unethical leadership has on followers, leading to new sensemaking in order to derive 
meaning from it and cope with the new reality. 
In this particular case, the supposed ethical leader was unethical, and the reasons 
employees didn’t realize it are related with the strong identification as we have seen 
above. Additionally, as mentioned before, an ethical leader should be a strong moral 
person, which is honest and trustworthy, and it should be a moral manager who sets and 
communicates ethical standards and uses rewards and punishments to ensure those 
standards are being followed (Brown and Mitchell, 2010, Treviño et al. 2000). Dr. 
Ricardo Salgado can be seen as a moral manager since he followed the above mention 
characteristics, however he lacked the second pillar Brown and Mitchell consider to be 
necessary for ethical leadership – moral person. Despise being seen as honest and 
trustworthy, in reality he wasn’t, therefore he lacked the moral person pillar to be an 
ethical leader. He wasn’t a moral person because he didn’t have a fully moral identity. As 
mentioned before, to have a moral identity one has to have internalization and 
symbolization, Dr. Ricardo only had the symbolization part and in fact internalization is 
the one more correlated with moral reasoning. By symbolization we are referring to the 
speeches he gave, the way he treated employees, the leadership decisions which were 
transmitted to employees. What he missed was internalization in the sense that his self-
concept was corrupted, after all not all the decisions made by him were ethical. 
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Leader behaviour, organizational prestige, support and trust are considered some of 
organizational identification antecedents as well as ethical leadership. When ethical 
behaviour is encouraged by holding employees accountable for their actions, treating 
employees fairly, and unethical behaviour is punished, followers will internalize those 
values. Thus ethics influences the degree of organizational identification (DeConinck, 
2011). In this case the employees had a strong identification with the leader and with the 
organization not only because they were working in a good institution (when comparing 
with competitors interviewees mentioned their pride in working for the best bank in 
Portugal) but also because they saw themselves in the leader, the ethical leader. 
Furthermore, individuals with strong organizational identification internalize the 
successes and failures of the organization, hence if the organization to which they identify 
with collapses, they suffer an existential loss (Brown & Mitchell, 2010; Mael & Ashforth, 
1992), which happened due to all the failed expectations and negative feelings and 
reactions found in the data. In order to respond to this unethical event that rocked 
employees’ world, there was a new process of sensemaking to reduce the knowledge gaps 
created by the event and to derive meaning from the ambiguity. 
We can see from the case that in organizations perceived as ethical and with strong 
identification, employees suffer a lot from the disruption of their reality, they 
psychologically struggle to find a new sense and attribute new meaning, and sometimes 
they even present psychophysiological reactions such as strokes and panic attacks.  
When sensebreaking occurs and people engage in a new process of sensemaking, they are 
in a liminal state. Liminality refers to “the condition of being betwixt and between, at the 
limits of existing social structures and when new structures are emerging” (Tempest, 
2007, page 821). With the termination of BES and the creation of Novo Banco, employees 
found themselves in a liminal stage. There are three main stages of a transition. The period 
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immediately before the transition is the pre-liminal stage – the individual still belongs to 
a specific and structured condition. The transition itself is the liminal stage – the 
individual does not belong to any of the pre or post conditions but at the same time 
belongs to both. The period immediately after the transition is the post-liminal stage – the 
individual enters and belongs to the new condition (Cunha et al., 2010; Van Gennep 
1908/1960). In our case, we can state the BES bank before August 3rd is the pre-liminal 
stage and Novo Banco can be considered the liminal stage since there is clearly an 
intention to sell the bank, hence it is only a means to achieve an end. When the bank is 
finally sold we then can say it is the post-liminal stage. 
It is in the liminal stage that one decides how to cope in the post-liminal stage. In the data 
analysis we could see that after processing all the information and arriving to a new 
sensemaking, employees reacted in different ways. Some followed an active coping 
strategy, which consisted either in proving their job inside the organization, i.e. showing 
they are worth to keep, or looking for alternatives outside. After the interviews took place, 
we now know there is an employee who already left the bank for a new job. We can state 
that the people who are in the organization for less time and are younger are more 
proactive in looking for alternatives outside the organization, whereas the eldest people 
and the ones who have been in the institution for longer time are either following an active 
coping strategy via hope and resilience or are following a passive coping strategy.  
Limitations and Future Research 
This study has some limitations regarding the timeframe of the interviews. We tackled 
the period immediately after the sensebreaking which has some disadvantages regarding 
the emotional availability of employees to answer all the questions in the most truthful 
and honest way since they are still processing all that happened. Additionally, there were 
some interviews that were not recorded, which can affect the depth of the statements.  
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For future research, it is interesting to understand how employees deal with the new entity 
that is being created. If they will emerge as a new and stronger organization or if what 
was lost cannot be recover at all. 
Conclusion 
Throughout the paper we provide evidence unethical leadership behavior has a direct 
impact on followers through negative emotions and failed expectations. It is caused by a 
sensebreaking event and as a consequence it is followed by a new sensemaking process. 
The impact unethical leadership behavior has on followers is particularly relevant in 
organizations with a strong identification. When there is strong identification employees 
suffer from the disruption of their reality since the identity is threat and/or even broken 
through sensebreaking, and they need to find a new meaning and fill knowledge gaps 
created – new sensemaking. This process of finding a new meaning is referred to as 
liminality and people react differently – active versus coping strategies. 
The BES case and its CEO, which was nominated the worst CEO of 2014 (Finkelstein, 
S., 2014), is a reference for future research since it shows ethical leaders must worry not 
only about how they are perceived by others, as pointed out by Brown (2007), but also 
with the actions they take, keeping consistency between the two components since it 
impacts employees’ organizational identification and consequently commitment.  
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1. Before the event (bankruptcy) how was your relationship with the bank? How 
did you feel about being connected with the bank? 
2. Do you think the bank is fully responsible for what happened or were there 
situational (e.g., current financial crisis) factors that could explain the event?  
a. Can you please rank the factors that you mentioned? 
b. In which way each factor previously mentioned by you contributed for 
the organization’s failure? 
3. This bankruptcy is having several implications for everyone related to the bank 
(clients, employees, investors, country, etc.). 
a. Which stakeholder(s) was/were more affected by this event? 
b. Do you see any positive consequences of this? Which ones and to 
whom? 
4. How this event has affected you personally? 
a. How did you feel when you knew the bank had bankrupted?  
b. What did you do/What is your action plan?  
c. How do you feel when people know that somehow you are related to the 
bank? 
5. How was your relationship with Espírito Santo’s family?  
a. How did you see their organization?  
b. How do you see that organization right now? 
6. Did your previously experienced something like this before? How was it?  
7. How have you been dealing with the clients? 
Final Questions: 











"The people that were there were proud of working for BES, the company is like a family 
business, everyone knows each other, and… well, working there was a pride" 
"It was a bank different from the others" 
"I was proud of belonging to BES. I was happy for belonging to a bank with so many… With a 
big influence for our country's economy and also in the companies' lives. All of that contributed 
to it, I enjoyed working. "  
"It was a pride, a pleasure." 
"It was a different feeling from what exists in the other companies" 
"All of us were proud in the institution" 
"It was a reference in the banking system" 
"Proud. My relationship was always great" 
"I am proud to work in BES, I am proud it was always connected with those values (trust, 
transparency, solidity) 
"A certain pride, it was a accredited institution, of respect. We had a status for working there. It 
was a status, a pride in the work." 
Commitment 
"My relationship with the bank is big and it is more that simply an employee, We defended a 
brand, an image, an institution, a bankers family, that was… I really felt I was part of the project, 
of the strategy and (...) it had a face, that was always Ricardo Salgado. (...) The one who lasted 
for ever and that continued was the Espirito Santo family, we defended a brand and I saw myself 
in it" 
"I liked where I worked, and I still do." 
"It was good (the relationship). I felt fine, this was a surprise for me" 
"My relationship with the bank was total love to the uniform" 
"We pulled the shirt, and we didn't stop doing it" 
"I felt part of the organization culture" 
"No one is for 13 years in an institution that doesn't like. 13 years is, it's already a strong 
connection and obviously I saw my self in the institution, in the its values, in the importance it 
had on the Portuguese society" 
Stability 
"[How I felt about being connected to the bank]I felt wonderfully well (…), the security here, the 
career, the follow-up on employees (…), we operated a lot like a family, we were a family and 
were associated to Banco Espirito Santo (…) BES was BES, was indeed a bank different from 
the others, a family bank, an old bank, a bank where people say themselves in the managers. At 
that time it was indeed great, and the bank always behaved very well, (...), we were well treated, 
we received profit distribution. (...) Hence, in a general way, here in Banco Espirito Santo, the 
people liked to be, because they say themselves here as being in family, and they enjoyed it, and 
they had a career, (...) of course in the middle of all of this there is still people unfairly treated, 
there is always, in every company, we at the time had 7000 employees, I am sure there are money 
complains, and with reason. (...) " 
"When the opportunity to be part of BES came, I had other alternatives, but I chose BES as being 
the safest choice, a solid bank, a big group." 
"Knowing that there was someone, Mr. Ricardo from de family side, which owned the bank, 
brought some tranquillity to the people" 
"It was a solid institution and by the time we though it had a really strong leadership" 
"Things can change from one moment to the other, and I think people were not aware of it." 
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"It affected me a lot because it's my job. (…)In the last 12 years this was the only steady aspect 
of my life, the rest was changing, wedding, etc." 
Leadership Reverence 
"I have colleagues that were fired because they (…) harmed the bank in for example, 30 
something, 300€, I am remembering an example that was fired for 300€, it was so bad (…) Of 
course I am not a fan, who steels, steels, not matter the amount (...) But many times there was 
doubt, if it was stolen or not. Now we see other that stole millions and millions, how is it going 
to be?" 
"We also had a colleague that was fired because he send a pornographic email to a customer by 
mistake." 
"Once a year he went to the branches to meet the managers, in other words, he was, and he 
intended to ask the manager himself how everything was going, how were the businesses in every 
single village." 
"It was a great identification with the figure and the company itself" 
"I had a great admiration for Ricardo Salgado, I always thought him as a guy with…, first he was 
very respected, and then was also the fact of being all these years heading the bank, also the family 
situation, but I always thought, I always admired much his technical capability, and influence" 
"I saw him as a straight person and a good manager." 
"I didn't have a relationship, but I could relate to him (identificava-me)" 
"I looked (to the family) with trust."; "He transmitted confidence to us" 
"I felt part and identified myself with" 
"The Dr. Ricardo was an idol for all of us. (…) We had great respect. (…) When he was arrested 
my direct was in the branch and started crying." 
"Inside the system I though he was a reference (…), I saw him as (…) an ethical reference" 
"I considered him a person with integrity and responsible." 
"I can say (…) 80 to 90% of the employees saw themselves in Dr. Ricardo. (…) He was a 
father/paternal figure, very charismatic, knew how to deal with employees. (…) A faultless 
person." 
"Yes, I identified myself, we had similar values." 
"The Dr. Ricardo enjoyed a great admiration." 
"The values that we assimilated and the ones that we forwarded to the clients were trust, 
transparency, solidity" 
"He was someone that went to the executive commission and danced with the girls, with our 
colleagues, he was someone that everyone loved, cared about a lot, and so this was awful" 
Illusion of Invulnerability 
"BES was seen has a bank that… (…) by being a big private bank and the fact it didn't used the 
public credit line for banks that other banks did (...), we were proud of never using that line. (...) 
I felt part of the organizational culture." 
"My bank was my bank, I sold it to everyone, everyone, even without being in the commercial 
department, I walked into a restaurant and saw something from Santander or BPI, 'ehh, what a 
shame, so you don't have, you are not a customer of the best Portuguese bank?'" 
"We  were in the square as a quality bank" 
"[the bank] was is first place as customer service, as prestige, as image itself, so it was indeed a 
great company, great in all levels, and you probably guess, it was a bucket of ice all that has 
happened" 
Unquestionable Belief 
"It was an institution that I somehow would recommend. So if I was in a position of 
recommending my friends to work there, (…) my answer would be yes, for sure. The same way 
as I would recommend clients to work with the bank because I believed in what I was doing, and 
I believed in what the bank was doing" 
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"From a certain point in time we stopped asking the questions that we should have done, (…) 
there was a whole organization that allowed it to happen (...), in that sense almost of us, that are 
part of the organization, are somehow responsible." 
"I believed in what I was doing." 
"It was a shock (…) and makes us wondering, these 19 years of full commitment, giving up a lot 
of stuff because I believed, I believed in the bank, in the project, I believed…now, this is a wag 
(abano)." 
Underestimation of Negative Indicators 
"Of course we already had, we almost guessed without believing much in what could happen" 
"We suspected before the news, (…) but I never thought it was like this." 
"I knew stories of CFO's who went there and in the day after left saying 'I don't work in this', so 
it was not unexpected, the people themselves known" 
“Some people more informed, and I not being the most informed, but had more information than 
many other, of course we already had, we almost guessed without believing much in what would 
happen." 
"People know there were many failures beyond all of that but no one ever thought it would happen 
what just happened" 
Surprise and Disbelief 
"It was a surprise";  "I was surprised" 
"It was unimaginable to me, I mean I had that man as a reference in the bankers." 
"There are people that I know inside the organization that express some, a feeling that I don't 
know, but they express some disbelief, almost denial." 
"It never cross my mind. (…) The beginning of August was for us a fall of everything on our 
heads (desabar de tudo em cima da cabeça). (…) We didn't even dream of it, (…) with the capital 
raise in June and all… (…) It was a disappointment." 
"Totally surprise, socked".  
"I wasn't expecting, I cannot find any adjective.(…) We were like 'this is not happening'." 
"The world going to the dogs (o mundo a desabar em cima da minha cabeça), i.e., 'this cannot be 
happening, this is not real, it is not possible, in a weekend, in a Sunday evening coming out a 
news like this', betrayal, I don't know, it was all that come to my mind., and more, 'how is it going 
to be tomorrow morning?'." 
"I didn't want to believe honestly, it was something that let me astonished, something I would 
never imagined, I felt that if that man was capable of doing that, then there was really no trust in 
the system." 
"Surprised, I was not expecting at all." 
"[the reaction was] Denial. It is not possible, there is still somebody that will say it is not like that, 
and Dr. Ricardo Salgado will still explain all of this, explain the logic. And then I came to myself 
and panicked." 
"[my reaction] was incredulous with what I was watching" 
"The reaction was incredibility, it is unbelievable all of this" 
"I was not thinking it was possible. (…) It shouldn't have been like this, on a weekend (…), it was 
hard to accept." 
"It is hard to believe he was that Machiavellian." 
"I never thought he would led the bank to bankruptcy and that deceived all the people." 
"Honestly I didn't realized what just happened, 'but what are they saying? That's nonsense.' That's 
it, because you were not expecting and didn't believed it was possible" 
"Indeed cold water was poured (Foi um balde de água fria)." 
"It affected me psychological concerning what were my expectations on the institution, I was 
astonished. (…) It was something unthinkable, I mean, I had that man as a reference in the banking 
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system (…) I considered him responsible and a person of integrity, it was the overthrown of what 
I though was still the last bastion of some seriousness in the capital market" 
Betrayal 
"Almost all of us felt betrayed, deceived, as well as the clients, as well as many people I think." 
"Bad. This is unbelievable. (…) This problem arises, all the administration leaves, the clients lost 
a reference, it is the employees, that show their face, the people that show their face for better and 
worst, hence it has a huge impact, especially because we don't have, we also don't have answers" 
"I felt a bit betrayed because he always transmitted an image of seriousness and honesty, in the 
messages to the collaborators and every time he spoke on the media, and then it turn out to be the 
opposite, hence that's it, betrayal.";  "What happen was a doorstep (rasteira)" 
"It is a bit like a cheated women in a couple, right? Or the cheated husband, it was the feeling." 
"I look at him as someone who tricked us all (…) he betrayed the ones who trusted him." 
 "Then a person question himself, I was this 13 year working for what, for whom, it was for people 
that are not honest, because I believed in the project they sold me" 
"The people that work with me lost their trust in part of the family, i.e., they looked at them as 
idols, as someone who can trust, they would have put their hands in the fire for them (pôr as mãos 
no fogo), and in this moment they don't trust in anything." 
"The family I identified myself with was not this family." 
Lost ID 
"Now it is indifferent to say I work at Novo Banco. (…) The pride that we had was maybe a bit 
of arrogance." 
"Injured pride, we lost our history, but with our head held high, because we didn't do anything 
wrong." 
"In BES I felt proud, in Novo Banco fear." 
"I am not embarrassed for being part of Novo Banco, but the prestige is not the same. We lost the 
status." 
"Before we were treated with respect, (…) now it feels you are a poor soul (um coitadinho)" 
"Most of us felt shamed, shamed for everything that happened, shame when we enter in a 
restaurant to have lunch, take a coffee, whatever, 'so, you are from Novo Banco or from the Bad 
bank? Those people, what have they done' (…) Shame. Because it was all and nothing. Being 
considered as gentlemen, we were different people, bankers from a real bank, not from a little 
bank. (...) Hence it is not easy, the shame." 
"Before if someone asked me where I worked, I would say with real pleasure that I worked at 
Banco Espírito Santo, now Novo Banco, it is not the same thing. (…) The culture disappeared a 
little. Hence it is more doing our job and see what happens." 
"The bank itself is undefined. The people there and that continued there are the people that trusted, 
just like the advertisement say, they established a solid relationship with the managers based on 
trust, because when the trust is lost, the bank will go down" 
"The Novo Banco still doesn't come down the throat (não desce da garganta para baixo) (…) 
because the BES is here in the heart." 
"The Novo Banco is not known from anywhere, it is a new raised bank, it has no rating, it has 
nothing." 
"The bank now is something abstract (…) It is uncomfortable. We had that figure, and now we 
have a fund."; "The culture disappeared a little." 
"It is like if it hasn't identity. The 145 years of history disappeared." 
"It is hard for me to say we are the youngest bank." 
"It is a brand that doesn't say anything to me. (…) I feel almost like an orphan." 
Disappointment and Sadness 
"I felt very disappointment, sad. (…) A person that works with love to the uniform (amor à 
camisola) feels betrayed (defraudada). (…) I never though I would be in this situation" 
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"That idea I had of him fell apart (…), he disappointed me very much (…), I lost the admiration 
I had." 
"I think about this as the other Pope who died and lots of people went to Vatican just for John 
Paul II, with the news ones there probably it's not the same think, it's like, you continue to be 
religious but it's not the same thing, you no longer have that affection and I think it is much like 
that. People saw him like an idol to follow, an example of leadership, solidity, etc... and then all 
of it after wall was a façade, and I think that is disappointing, you really don't know how to react" 
"When we start realizing what was happening, it was a disappointment, it was quite sad." 
"After all it was a façade and I think that is very disappointing." 
"I am disappointed because it really seems it was bad management." 
"It was a big shock. We can say we have been through all grief stages. First denial. Second revolt, 
I am still trying to get out of this yet. I feel I have been deceived, and without intention I have 
deceived other. (…) I believed in what I was doing. I felt betrayed, but I have to continue to show 
my face." 
"My uncles worked there, my cousins worked there, my father used to supply its canteen, so it is 
a relationship from generations and obviously I was sad" 
"Psychological it was very hard." 
"I felt sad" 
"My reaction was essentially sadness." 
"It was a big shock. We can say we have been through all grief stages. First denial. Second revolt, 
I am still trying to get out of this yet. I feel I have been deceived, and without intention I have 
deceived other. (…) I believed in what I was doing. I felt betrayed, but I have to continue to show 
my face." 
"The psychological part is also important, having, being busy (…) it is important for emotional 
stability, not showing an eventual emotional instability to others, to the family. (...)" 
"Sentimentally destroyed. It is a lot of shame for everything that happen." 
"A mix of frustration, disappointment, worry,…" 
"The daily life is complicated, this is also emotional instability that affects us." 
"It was a reverse in all the structural and psychological construction people had of themselves 
inside the bank, the security of the company BES" 
"I was in vacations. I panicked (…) I was terrified for 3 hours without knowing if I had a job." 
Instability and Worries 
"All the people I know always lived for the bank and always fought for it, and now is like…, I 
don't know, suddenly you lost the ground, you really don't know what is going to happen" 
"We are now in the uncertainty" 
"It was the end of an organization in which I worked for 13 year, and that reality is over. In this 
moment I am confronted with dealing with the uncertainty, something is not always easy." 
"We all are without knowing what will happen, hence there is high instability, there is the fear of 
loosing the job in the near future." 
"Then there is the fact of being in a indefinite situation. (…) There is a motivation and an 
insecurity problem. (…) It is a big stress factor, like there is no information." 
"We have no answers. (…)  Today we don't know the route (rumo)." 
"I was very scare when the Banco de Portugal intervened, apprehensive for my future and 
anxious." 
"It only affected me in terms of labour stress, not for me but for my colleagues, they are stressed 
and pass it to the other people. They are always talking about retrenchment." 
"Honestly I haven't yet stop to think in all of this, to reflect, in other words, it has been one day at 
a time, of course everyone is worried, nobody knows." 
"It is the rise from the ashes but we feel discredited." 
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"It affected me in the sense if my personal decision of coming to BES was the right one or not. 
(…) I am still trying to digest and understand what it will bring because, well, it is instability. (…) 
"I felt…'what am I doing here?'. (…) I found almost 100% of the people scare." 
"Having or not a job, the possibility of being unemployed is very high. (…) " 
Psychophysiological Reactions 
"I know someone, that was my account manager as employee,  that had a break-down/depression" 
"I have colleagues in Lisbon who are in a psychiatric sick leave. They are afraid [of the clients]" 
"Psychologically it is a constant war. We are suffering bullying" 
"I have colleagues in the branches with beginnings of heart attacks and strokes, being sent to the 
hospital in ambulance. (…) Even I, I have here an huge line of people just to talk to me. I had 
panic attacks where I had to go to the back-office to pull myself together and then come back as 
nothing happened and keep talking to them" 
Internal Accountability 
"Obviously the problems come from the inside.(…) First external factors, and then internal in the 
way things were handled. They have used the bank to finance other companies." 
"I believe the great majority of the problems arised with Angola(…) If we hadn´t have that 
problem, probably none of this would have happen. (…) Other companies that operate at a foreign 
level and that received our money, were then fraudulent companies. Therefore, that was the big 
problem, and I think that the big responsibles there are indeed, the great majority, part of the 
Espírito Santo family. (...) A very important issue is the fact that the regulator, the Banco de 
Portugal, that didn't work." 
"I believe there were situations (…) where it is clear the guilt is in a short nucleus of people, or 
the responsibility (instead of guilt).(...) Other banks cleaned their balance sheets when the crisis 
came, the bank opted not to do it in the time, and (...) I believe  it was a little bit the beginning of 
the end because it was already a time where we probably needed help." 
"If there weren't the family problems (financing family companies from another industries), the 
bank wouldn't have any. (…) It was seen by the analysts as the first that would recover when the 
economy turned around because it was the bank that was present in the companies. (…) It was 
also that problem from Angola." 
"The biggest factor that lead to this bankruptcy was the family influencing many of the decisions, 
not only in the bank bit in the companies of the group" 
"The management was totally responsible" 
 "It feels like there was a strong weigh on the management side of the bank. (…) There was 
negligence in controlling parts of the group, as it is the case if BES Angola. (…) It was the so 
called going through the motions (empurrar com a barriga para a frent) in the case of Espirito 
Santo Financial Group, where it feels like he was trying to save the assets and was always digging 
deeper and deeper (ia-se enterrando casa vez mais). (...) The responsibility is more internal than 
external." 
"I think the bank was responsible, specifically the administration, (…), of course the situation 
helped (…) while there was money, while it was easy to monetize, things were covered (…)."     
(crisis, indebt family) 
"Essentially was about internal factors. The external ones don't have much relevance. (…) There 
is the businesses in Angola, but the actions always came from the administration." 
"That is a lot of greed, ambition, lots of power games." 
Multiple Accountability 
"I think it is a bit of both. (…) BES went for the crisis without officialising it was in crisis, 
therefore it is natural that the crisis has influenced it. (…) The other part is also true, I mean, when 
you make decisions usually you know what you are doing." 
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"It was not just Ricardo Salgado, there were another political factors, another businesses. (…) 
The internal factors have a bigger expression. (…) They have used BES's money to cover the 
most complicated businesses of the group" 
"There were another factors. (…) The bank have improper attitudes but the financial situation or 
the interests of other companies in the group had influence. (…) Both factors are equated. (…) 
The group situation was motivated by the crisis." 
"Maybe there were external factors contributing. (…) From the moment there is a regulator, so 
many audits, they should have had access to the information. (…) Clearly it is the bank's fault, 
but existing other auditing entities it could have been avoided, at least the way it happened." 
"I wouldn't say the bank was responsible for what it did, because when we talk about the bank we 
talk mostly about the people who have contact with the public. (…) What I think  (…) is that there 
are many combined interests. (…) This year is eve of the elections year. (...) There comes a point 
in which being smart and good at your job is not enough, i.e., we need to pass over other people, 
there has to be combined interests, and the largest crush the weakers. (...) They have taken 
advantage of the information they have for their own enjoyment, forgetting the entity that is 
behind." 
"As an external factor the financial crisis, but it is clear it was missing management control 
systems, it should have been taken measures in specific times that wouldn't, would have not 
reached the rupture point it did. (…) What we know is the connections with the group, with 
companies from the group, with the family companies." 
"I think the guilt is always from two sides." 
"A little of both. In a way the administration used and abused the position they had and the 
dimension of the sales force. (…) Then on the other side, there is the speculation, the speculation 
and the market led it to happen, or accelerated the process. (...) It was first internal factors, , 
otherwise the speculation wouldn't have foundation." 
Hope 
"Now more than ever it is a bank that can be trusted. [because all the toxic assets were removed]" 
"People keep working (…) believing the Novo Banco is a viable process, that if everyone pilots 
in the same direction, we can turn around." 
"I think it can work (Novo Banco) (…). Now with a professional structure I think it could have a 
future. (…) It is necessary to eliminate the mediate phenomena." 
 "The future exists, we don't know in which frames, but I think it is possible the brand to stay." 
"I look to the future with fear and hope." 
"The bank has a lot of value. It is an interesting business for any bank. (…) It has a future and has 
lots to teach and also to learn." 
"This is stupid and naive but I still deep down have the hope he will come to explain, that there 
is a logic." 
"Even after everything that happen, and all that we know today, (…), I still think maybe 10 to 
20% of employees still think, still think, he was deceived, (…) and maybe 5 to 10% still think he 
is coming back, he is going to buy back the bank" 
Scepticism 
"The Novo Banco hardly, I do not believe at all, will remain as Novo Banco, hence the name. 
(…) The Novo Bank is … is nothing, it is a transactional figure, it is at contract, we have here a 
fixed-term where it is Novo Banco. We do not identify with it, not even with the butterfly (...)" 
"We know this is at fixed-term (a prazo)" 
"The solution was never tested in Portugal, and there isn't..., we are being the human guinea 
pigs(cobaias) of a solution that initially was thought as medium run and so we could recover the 
goodwill the bank had and come back as a new institution in the market, with other designation, 
with other image, with other name, (...) [but] given the will to find a quick solution for the bank, 
quick solution that is to sell the bank" 
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"I think we are waiting, waiting for a political decision. (…) We are in limbo" 
"I see the bank in which of two ways, or it can be a huge opportunity to do something well done 
from the scratch, or a disaster at the outset. (…) In this moment instability rules, what they want 
is to organize as quick as possible to know how it will be sold." 
"A lots of question marks, i.e., one day at a time, but we are always preparing, we are paying 
closer attention to the plan B." 
"I don't look to the future with good eyes, in terms of the organization I think it will be acquired 
for another big financial group and completely loose its own identity." 
"As a bank it is over, (…) it will be sold. (…) I think we are being the guinea pigs" 
"For me the future is being part of another, (…) at least it is the short-term perspective, that is 
transmitted by the media" 
"Very worried, very worried" 
"There is uncertainty concerning the future (…) The BES institution I think is already over, (…) 
the future what will happen is being acquired for others and disappear" 
"I don't think there is a future, as an alone bank it doesn't, apparently the idea is to sell" 
"Being bought" 
"I look to the future very discouraged." 
Resilience 
"We were here the next day.(…) We have the ambition of making this work." 
"We always faced the situation, we continued fighting (continuámos a ir à luta). (…) I believe 
this is a bad moment, and deep down I believe we will surpass the situation." 
"Our first concern were the clients. (…) In the moment we started realizing  the clients situation 
were ok in general, then we started to worry about ourselves." 
"It was harder to motivate the team" 
"I already though of several scenarios, indeed I say that to the people who work with me, it is not 
to scar, I am not going to leave the ship" 
"In this moment the plan that we all have is to show that we have the right to our job." 
New Action Plan 
"My plan is to pay attention, to everything, all the news, all the details people mention, and keep 
my eyes in the labour market, try to find a back-up plan as soon as possible." 
"I don't yet think I should look for other things. (…) We never know if a future decision will be 
good or bad. I am patiently waiting. It might even be a good opportunity. The solution can benefit 
some employees. If not there are other places to work. I am not scared." 
"I tried to evaluate if the solution taken would somehow open some future perspectives [in Novo 
Banco], (…) at the same time look for alternatives outside (…). The first step that people should, 
that the majority of people probably did was to update the résumé and start to see in which way 
outside the bank might go, including, not in my case, but including thinking in personal projects, 
having their own business." 
"I have to look for alternatives" 
"I already had my plan of action, mas I think not all people have yet understand they have to find 
another job." 
"I would say people sometimes need a kick in the butt (um chuto no rabo) to move forward" 
Inertia 
"I still patiently wait the end of the story" 
"I am just looking for information" 
"Given my age and familiar situation, probably I will be unemployed." 
"My action plan is to see what happens." 
"The strategy is to recover. I haven't developed any other action plan yet." 
"I feel indifferent (…) because I am no longer emotionally connected, I am just waiting for the 
end." 
